

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA  
STATESBORO DIVISION

DONALD SMALL,	)	
	)	
Petitioner,	)	
	)	
v.	)	CV 621-032
	)	
ANNETTIA TOBY, Warden,	)	
	)	
Respondent.	)	

---

**MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION**

---

The above-captioned case, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, is before the Court for initial review pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. The Court **REPORTS** and **RECOMMENDS** the § 2254 petition be **DISMISSED** as untimely and this civil action be **CLOSED**.

**I. BACKGROUND**

On December 29, 2003, Petitioner was sentenced in Bulloch County Superior Court to twenty years in prison based on his convictions for, *inter alia*, kidnapping, armed robbery, burglary, and aggravated assault. (Doc. no. 1, p. 1.) Petitioner reports he did not pursue a direct appeal or any form of post-conviction collateral relief. (Id. at 2-5.)

Petitioner executed the instant federal habeas corpus petition on March 5, 2021, and he originally filed it in the Middle District of Georgia. (Id. at 15.) United States District Judge Marc T. Treadwell transferred the petition to the Southern District of Georgia because

Petitioner challenges convictions obtained in a superior court located within this District. (Doc. no. 3.) Petitioner claims the state courts do not have jurisdiction over his federal claim that his imprisonment is invalid because the prison warden “does not have first[-]hand knowledge of the crime thus making his false imprisonment of the prisoner null and void, invalid.” (Doc. no. 1, p. 14.)

## **II. DISCUSSION**

### **A. The Petition Is Time-Barred**

Pursuant to the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), there is a one-year statute of limitations for § 2254 motions that runs from the latest of:

(1)(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.

Under § 2244(d)(1)(A), a judgment becomes final upon “the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” See Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 150 (2012) (explaining judgment for petitioners who do not seek certiorari from

United States Supreme Court becomes final at “expiration of the time for seeking such review” - when the time for pursuing direct review in this Court, or in state court, expires.”). Because Petitioner did not file a direct appeal following his conviction and sentencing in December of 2003, his conviction became “final” when the thirty-day period to appeal expired. O.C.G.A. § 5-6-38(a) (“A notice of appeal shall be filed within 30 days after entry of the appealable decision or judgment complained of.”). Thus, Petitioner’s conviction became final on or about January 28, 2004.

Petitioner had one year from the date his conviction became final to file his federal habeas corpus petition or take other action to toll the one-year limitations period. The Court recognizes that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), the one-year statute of limitations does not run while a properly filed application for state post-conviction relief or other collateral review is pending in state court. Cramer v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 461 F.3d 1380, 1383 (11th Cir. 2006). However, Petitioner states he did not file any request for post-conviction relief. (Doc. no. 1, pp. 2-5.) Thus, the instant petition filed in March of 2021, over seventeen years after his conviction became final in 2004, is untimely.

**B. The Limitations Period Was Not Otherwise Reset under AEDPA, and Petitioner Has Not Shown that He Is Entitled to Equitable Tolling or that a Fundamental Miscarriage of Justice Has Occurred**

Petitioner has not provided any explanation that would delay or reset his one-year statute of limitations under any statutory sections of AEDPA set forth above. Nevertheless, an otherwise untimely § 2254 petition may be considered if a petitioner can demonstrate that either he is entitled to equitable tolling or that a fundamental miscarriage of justice has occurred. Equitable tolling can be applied to prevent application of AEDPA’s statutory deadline, but only if a petitioner “shows ‘(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently,

and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way’ and prevented timely filing.” Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010) (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)); see also Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 336 (2007). Nevertheless, equitable tolling is typically applied sparingly, Steed v. Head, 219 F.3d 1298, 1300 (11th Cir. 2000), and is available “only in truly extraordinary circumstances.” Johnson v. United States, 340 F.3d 1219, 1226 (11th Cir. 2003). The petitioner bears the burden of proving his entitlement to equitable tolling, San Martin v. McNeil, 633 F.3d 1257, 1268 (11th Cir. 2011), and will not prevail based upon a showing of either extraordinary circumstances or diligence alone; the petitioner must establish both. See Chavez v. Sec’y Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 647 F.3d 1057, 1072 (11th Cir. 2011).

Consideration of an otherwise untimely petition for federal habeas corpus relief may also be appropriate upon a showing that a “fundamental miscarriage of justice” has occurred, whereby “a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.” McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 392 (2013) (citing Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495-96 (1986)); see also Wyzykowski v. Dep’t of Corr., 226 F.3d 1213, 1218-19 (11th Cir. 2000). The actual innocence exception “is exceedingly narrow in scope,” and a time-barred petitioner seeking to invoke it must be able “(1) to present ‘new reliable evidence . . . that was not presented at trial,’ and (2) to show ‘that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt’ in light of the new evidence.” Rozzelle v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 672 F.3d 1000, 1011 (11th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). As the Supreme Court emphasized, “The miscarriage of justice exception, we underscore, applies to a severely confined category: cases in which new evidence shows ‘it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would

have convicted [the petitioner].” McQuiggin, 569 U.S. at 394-95.


Here, Petitioner has not shown extraordinary circumstances stood in his way and prevented him from timely filing his federal petition, or that he had been pursuing his rights diligently during the approximately seventeen years between when his convictions became final and when he filed his federal petition. Petitioner’s only explanation for not filing for post-conviction relief is that “[a]t the time, knowledge was not obtained on how to proceed.” (Doc. no. 1, p. 5.) The Eleventh Circuit does not accept “a lack of legal education and related confusion or ignorance about the law as [an] excuse[] for a failure to file in a timely fashion. As with any litigant, *pro se* litigants ‘are deemed to know of the one-year statute of limitations.’” Perez v. Florida, 519 F. App’x 995, 997 (11th Cir. 2013) (*per curiam*) (internal citations omitted); see also Jones v. United States, 304 F.3d 1035, 1044 (11th Cir. 2002) (rejecting ignorance of law, inefficiencies, or inconveniences as qualifying as extraordinary circumstances). Eleventh Circuit precedent is clear a petitioner in federal court seeking to invoke equitable tolling must explain “any independent efforts he made to determine when the relevant limitations period began to run.” Arthur v. Allen, 452 F.3d 1234, 1253 (11th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted); Howell v. Crosby, 415 F.3d 1250, 1252 (11th Cir. 2005) (finding no basis for equitable tolling “especially when the petitioner cannot establish his own diligence in ascertaining the federal habeas filing deadline”). Petitioner does not argue, let alone provide any factual detail to support a finding, he made any efforts to determine when his federal statute of limitations began to run. In sum, Petitioner has not satisfied the “strong burden to show specific facts to support his claim of extraordinary circumstances and due diligence.” Brown v. Barrow, 512 F.3d 1304, 1307 (11th Cir. 2008) (*per curiam*).

Nor has Petitioner shown a miscarriage of justice will occur if his claims are not considered. Petitioner has not presented any evidence, much less new, reliable evidence, to show he did not commit the offenses of which he was convicted such that no reasonable juror would have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Rather, Petitioner raises a legally baseless argument concerning the warden's "first-hand" knowledge of Petitioner's crimes. Therefore, neither equitable tolling nor the actual innocence exception saves the instant petition from being time-barred under AEDPA.

### III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court **REPORTS** and **RECOMMENDS** the § 2254 petition be **DISMISSED** as untimely and this civil action be **CLOSED**.

SO REPORTED and RECOMMENDED this 6th day of May, 2021, at Augusta, Georgia.



---

BRIAN K. EPPS  
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE  
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA